

City of London - Application for Appointment to City of London Community Advisory Committees

Application

Committee you are interested in serving on: **Animal Welfare Community Advisory Committee**

Contact Information

Name: **Miriam Love**

City: **London**

Province: **ON**

Postal Code: **N5W 3X3**

Experience and Qualifications

If you have experience on a London Advisory Committee, please provide dates and details. (max. 250 characters):

This would be my first experience working on a London Advisory Committee.

What do you hope to contribute or learn as part of a Community Advisory Committee? (max. 250 characters):

**I hope to contribute my ability to see and appreciate complex issues and perspectives, and to seek compromise.
I hope to learn more about by-laws, as well as Provincial and Federal legislation--and how these work together (or at odds) for animal welfare.**

How will you support the work of a Community Advisory Committee? (max. 250 characters):

By coming prepared and willing to work.

We value the contributions of Londoners with diverse experiences and welcome applications from individuals who share our commitment. Please describe how your work, community or lived experience will enhance these efforts through Community Advisory Committee work. (max. 3000 characters):

**1.) My volunteer work (with Antler River Rally--see below) has allowed me to work with individuals and groups with diverse perspectives to do work for the community, even if there is disagreement on particular political or social issues. This work is also representative of the importance, to me, of broad ecological thinking and planning--both in philosophical and in practical terms.
2.) I have always had rescue animals. and I am quite interested in the well being of companion animals and wildlife in our City (and beyond).
3.) I am also particularly interested in how Londoners with limited means may benefit from companion animals and be supported, so that they may keep their pets.
I also know that there will be the necessity for rules , and rules that are enforceable, regarding animals and people. I am interested this work to help animals and to serve the community of which I am a part.**

Please describe additional experience, training, or community involvement that will help you in your role as a Community Advisory Committee Member. (max. 250 characters):

**Please see CV, attached. I am the co-founder of a London-based volunteer group, Antler River Rally. We organise monthly clean-ups of the Antler/ Thames with diverse groups of volunteers; we've been working in the community for 12 years.
I have also worked--years ago--as a volunteer at the Humane Society in Stillwater, Oklahoma.**

Attach resume or other document here, if needed:

Attach more files here, if needed:

Confirmations

I declare the following: **I am at least 18 years old.; I am not a City employee or Council member.; I understand that the commitment may be up to 4 hours per month to attend meetings and prepare.; I understand that my application and any attachments will be included on a public agenda that is published on the City website.**

To help inform our outreach activities, please tell us how you heard about this opportunity:
(optional): **Word of mouth**

If you selected 'Other', please specify:

Submitted on: **5/6/2024 5:43:31 PM**

MIRIAM LOVE

- London, Ontario, N5W 3X3
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EDUCATION

Ph. D. Candidate (ABD), Theory and Criticism

Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism

Western University, London, Ontario, Sept. 2006- May 2011

Master of Arts in English

English Department

Oklahoma State University, Stillwater, Oklahoma, Jan. 2000- June 2005

Bachelor of Arts in English

English Department

Earlham College, Richmond, Indiana, Sept. 1993- June 1998

RECENT WORK EXPERIENCE

Manager, Academic Advising

King's University College

London, Ontario. April 22-present

- Manage a diverse team of 12 Academic Counsellors, Program Advisors, and Information Assistants; address unit and individual needs, workflow, and professional development
- Articulate mission and vision of Advising unit at King's and help to carry out through everyday practices, and long and short-term goal setting
- Develop and implement strategy, technologies, and materials to address student needs and improve retention and student experience

Academic Counsellor

King's University College

London, Ontario September 2016-present

- Counsel students on various academic programs within the institution; guide students towards most fulfilling academic paths; discuss extra-curricular as well as post-graduate opportunities
- Assess consideration requests; mediate between students and faculty and advise on appropriate accommodation
- Develop programming, and devise best ways to deliver information and help students gain competency in navigating University systems and opportunities

TEACHING and RESEARCH EXPERIENCE

Part-time Professor

Modern Languages (English)
King's University College
London, Ontario Sept. 2013- May 2017

- Taught English Literature courses (1027, 1028 (The Storyteller's Art I & II; and 2307 Major British Authors), and English 2017 (Reading Popular Culture)
- Developed course outlines, prepare and deliver original lectures, responded to student concerns and assessed student work

Instructor

School of Language and Liberal Studies
Fanshawe College
London, Ontario, September 2012- May 2013

- Taught photography theory and professional communications for students in various vocational tracks
- Developed coursework materials, delivered lectures and marked papers for several large courses

Research Assistant and Marker

English Department (Krista Lysack)
King's University College
London, Ontario, Sept. 2012-May 2015

- Located and assessed reports of a 19th century shipwreck; provided detailed feedback on Children's Literature, Introduction to Literature, and British Literature essays

Teaching Assistant

Department of Philosophy (Steve Lofts)
King's University College
London, Ontario, Sept. 2010-May 2011

- Demonstrated knowledge of material and marked essays and exams for forty plus students

Research Assistant

English Department (Chris Keep)
Western University
London, Ontario, Sept 2010-May 2011 and Sept. 2006-May 2007

- Located connections between Karl Marx and Nineteenth Century Spiritualism
- Assessed contemporary re-thinking of key Marxist terms

Teaching Assistant

Department of Philosophy (Steve Lofts)
King's University College

London, Ontario, Sept. 2008- May 2009

- Created questions and lectures, and led discussions for two tutorial sessions
- Developed students' critical reading and thinking skills by posing challenging questions
- Marked exams and essays for over forty students

Teaching Assistant

English Department (Jennifer Venn)

Western University

London, Ontario, Sept. 2007-May 2008

- Structured and led tutorial sessions for 45 students
- Taught literary analysis of Eighteenth-Century prose and poetry
- Provided weekly assessments of student presentations

Limited-Duties Instructor

Writing, Rhetoric, and Professional Communication Centre

Western University

London, Ontario, July-August, 2007

- Taught rhetorical analysis, critical thinking and writing skills in an intensive six-week course
- Chose and marked appropriate assignments for a class of students from various backgrounds and disciplines

Instructor

English Department

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma, Sept. 2001- May 2004

- Created syllabi, structured daily assignments, and managed marking for two classes of 25 students
- Taught critical analysis, writing skills, and research methods, and fostered a professional classroom environment
- Characterized in anonymous student evaluations as "approachable," "enthusiastic," and "an effective communicator"

Writing Center Tutor

English Department

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma, Jan. 2000 - May, 2001

- Provided one-on-one tutoring to help students identify and resolve problems with essay writing and critical analysis of texts
- Created and led presentations for composition students on general writing and revision strategies

Editorial Assistant

Cimarron Review Literary Magazine

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma, Sept. 2001-May 2004

- Read and selected fiction manuscripts to recommend for publication

Editorial Assistant

Speculations Textbook

Oklahoma State University

Stillwater, Oklahoma, May-August, 2003

- Located and helped select texts for this custom-published textbook for composition students in university
- Developed discussion, critical analysis, and research questions for several of the included selections

Selected Professional Development

Career Development Practitioner Certificate courses, Fanshawe College, London, Ontario, 2021-present

- Relevant coursework completed: *Orientation to Employment Counselling, Career Transition and Change Management, Applied Organizational Psychology*

Safe TALK Training, Canadian Mental Health Association, 2017

Mental Health First Aid Training, Canadian Mental Health Association, 2017

First Aid Training, King's University College, December 2021

Teaching Freshman Composition Course, Oklahoma State University, 2000

- A semester-long course involving reading and written components, roundtable discussions of teaching strategies and difficulties, and sitting in and commenting on other instructors' classes

Tutor Training, Oklahoma State University, 2000

- A semester-long course focusing on practical tutoring experience, reflection, and group discussion, especially with a diverse population of students

CONFERENCE PRESENTATIONS

"Riverwork." *Animate Entities: Objects in Performance*. U of Toronto; Toronto, ON (March 2016).

"Writing is Not Zoo-keeping: Coetzee and the Question of the Animal." *The Inhuman: Investigating the Humanities in Continental Thought* York University; Toronto, Ontario, (Oct. 2008).

“Animalising the Asphalt: Companion Species and Posthuman Cities.” *Popular Culture Association National Conference*, San Francisco, CA, (Mar. 2008).

“Peripatetic Unbound: Writing, Walking, and Resistance.” *Tactics of Resistance: Limitations & Possibilities*. Centre for the Study of Theory and Criticism, UWO; London, Ontario, (Oct. 2007).

HONOURS AND SERVICE

Co-Founder , <i>Antler River Rally (ARR)</i> , London, Ontario	May 2012-present
Committee Member (King’s U) , Sustainability Committee	Sept 2019-present
Committee Member (King’s U) , Negotiations	Sept 2020-present
Community-Based Learning Partner (ARR/King’s)	Sept. 2017-present
Committee Member (Kings U) , Social Club	Sept 2019-Aug 2021
USC Teaching Honour Roll , Western University	2015-2016
Workshop Co-facilitator , <i>Language Day</i> , Western University	May 2014,2015,2016
Committee Member , <i>Poetry London</i>	2014-2016
Senior Editor , <i>Wordsfest Zine</i> , Insomniac Press, London, Ontario	2015,2016, 2017
Workshop Leader , <i>Gathering in the Garden (Poetry)</i> , Lord Roberts PS	May 2014,2015,2016
Facilitator , Philosophy Club in preparation for Green Fest, King’s University College	2013
Steward , Graduate Teaching Assistant’s Union, UWO (Western)	2008-2009
Councilor , Society of Graduate Students, UWO (Western)	2006-2008
Member , Graduate Student Equity Committee, UWO (Western)	2006-2008
Panel Chair / Moderator , Graduate Student Conference, UWO (Western)	2008
Volunteer , Humane Society of Stillwater, Oklahoma	2004-2005
Secretary , English Graduate Association, OSU (Oklahoma State University)	2003-2004
Leader , Orientation Workshops for Incoming Teaching Assistants, OSU	2002-2004
Treasurer , Creative Writer’s Association, OSU	2001-2002
Named “ best teacher ” by former student at President’s Open House,	

CENTRE FOR THE STUDY OF THEORY AND CRITICISM, THE UNIVERSITY OF WESTERN
ONTARIO, LONDON, ONTARIO

Animalecocities

Field exam Submission

DRAFT

Miriam Love

4/29/2011

Submitted to Professor Christopher Keep, Professor Michael Gardiner and Professor Chris Roulston
15 April 2011



A new animal rebellion is quashed by human authorities, and the animals return to the zoo.¹

¹ Jean-Ignace-Isidore Grandville. From *Grandville's Animals*. Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 2010.

What does it mean to bring the animal into the city? Or, perhaps more pointedly, what does it mean to bring animals *back* into the city and into everyday life? As John Berger argues, the process of eliminating animals from daily life, from cities, and from their powerful role in mythology is one that began in the 19th century and was completed in the 20th (*Looking* 3). While Berger further suggests that modern zoos stand as monuments to this disappearance—as well as to petrified human existence under capitalism—Akira Mizuta Lippit argues that this disappearance results in modern melancholia: “the modern animal evolved into a lost object that could then, in turn, be mourned” (*Electric* 3). Lippit describes a well-circulated anthropological myth as functioning very similarly to the Freudian process of mourning: while animal and human being and world were once indistinguishable, as human beings became more aware of themselves as part of a distinctly human world, “the animal was metamorphosed into an other creature. In turn, the animal came to inhabit a new topology of its own, and humanity was left to mourn for its former self...a self that became dehumanized in the very process of humanity’s becoming-human” (*Electric* 18). Modern humanity is in caught in a perpetual state of mourning for both its former undivided self, and for the now-objectified and elusive “other,” the animal.

Lippit points to Carl Jung’s description of modern, scientific man, of human being divorced from nature and animals as “dehumanized”, and suggests that it is “now the human world that suffers from the exclusion of animals, whereas before it was precisely the removal of animals that allowed human beings to establish their autonomy” (*Electric* 17). That is, for Lippit, Jung’s suggestion that the disappearance of animals has left humanity impoverished is a reversal of the sacrificial structure which subjects and excludes the animal to produce human authority and autonomy. Giorgio Agamben describes this sacrificial structure as the way in

which “man” is produced through the exclusion of the animal. Indeed, for Agamben, this structure is a part of the “anthropological machine”: “because *Homo sapiens*...is neither a clearly defined species nor a substance; it is, rather, a machine or device for producing the recognition of the human” (*The Open* 27). This optical machine allows for man to recognize himself in the non-human; through a recognition (of difference), the “human” is defined over and against this “other,” the animal.

Cary Wolfe, as well, addresses the ways in which animals—or figures of the animal—are used by and produce “that fantasy figure called ‘the human’” (*Rites* 6). Indeed, Wolfe suggests that the ways in which “the human” is defined over and against the excluded animal is a part of the discourse of species “that has made the *institution* of speciesism fundamental...to the formation of Western subjectivity and sociality as such, an institution that relies on the tacit agreement that the full transcendence of the ‘human’ requires the sacrifice of the ‘animal’ and the animalistic, which in turn makes possible a sacrificial economy in which we engage in what Derrida will call a ‘noncriminal putting to death’ of other *humans* as well by marking them as *animal*” (*Rites* 6). That is, while institutionalized speciesism (re)produces the “human,” it does so not only by sacrificing the animal, but also by sacrificing “other” humans against whom, for example, a gender, a class, a nation might define itself. Thus, while the question of the animal—is concerned with animals---real animals who suffer, and also about a failure of language surrounding the animal and individual animals, it is also about human being, about a humanity which defines itself by abjecting the animal and which suffers its own dubious relationship to language.

Furthermore, in its insistence on thinking beyond identity politics, and beyond a simple transference of some part of something named “human” rights to “the animal,” the question of

the animal is interested in rethinking the possibilities of a cosmopolitics. That is, “the animal” demands a re-thinking of the rights and protections of those –animal and human (and perhaps, as Bruno Latour suggests, things)—without protection or status within nation-states. And, as Matthew Calarco argues in *Zoographies*, in its challenge to the metaphysical anthropomorphism that underlies liberal humanism, the question of the animal bears an opportunity to re-radicalise left-wing politics as well as a chance to retrieve the revolutionary potentialities of Deleuzian and Derridian critiques of subjectivity.

Alongside the animal, or upon its heels, is the question of nature. The question of the animal and the question of nature are often intertwined. This is not only because each has been the excluded or dominated other (or the mourned lost object), but also because of a tendency to generalize each, or to conflate one with the other in an even broader generalization. As well, animal and nature are similarly difficult to grasp—as general concepts, and especially as particulars. Thus, animals and natural things call out for a new discourse, a recognition and response. As Matthew Calarco suggests, the question of the animals (to which I’ll add the question of nature) needs a revolution in language that cannot be produced through scientific and philosophical discourse (*Zoographies* 6). Indeed, animals and natural things do need a discourse, not merely to be “protected” by an uncritical humanist position. Both Bruno Latour, in his “Parliament of Things” and Donna Haraway, in her “entanglements” have imagined webs of discourse and response that re-figure and re-position all things as actors, intertwined in activity.

The animal is vanished and abjected from the city; yet this loss continues to be mourned as the animal haunts and defines the city and humanity’s borders. When the city has often been defined—by Plato and Aristotle to Hannah Arendt—as providing the most fully human existence, and as a necessity for the flourishing of human society, to carve out a space for, or to

try to re-figure, or call out the presence of the animal is to trouble the very foundations of the city. Certainly, to imagine an animal city, one must re-visit and re-think the humanist foundations of the city, the idea of the city as the most human of creations or as the space necessary for one to become fully human or political. I want to try to think an inhuman city—specifically, an animal city—which demands responses between animals and humans, beings and things: a new production.

I hope that thinking about the animal in the city might be a way of figuring a new constellation of animal, nature and city, which re-focuses, and re-problematizes each of these terms in productive ways. This constellation, I think, might help expose and open the non-identity of human, animal, nature and city as concepts, and free or empty them to different existences and assemblages². My starting place is the question of the animal, and so I follow, at some length, Derrida's question of the animal and its problematisation of subjectivity. Animals are often envisioned as a part of determined "nature;" and nature, too, must be interrogated: in what follows, I present some ways in which nature might be cracked open or at least queried. And finally, I dwell for some time on the possibility of a cosmopolitical animal, an animal city, of ways into thinking animalecocities. I should assert that my wanderings are more rhizomatic than rooted, and my writing more explorative than rigorously argumentative. It is my hope, however, that I shall forge friendly-enough paths as I define my field of study.

The Question of the Animal

In his introduction to Wolfe's *Animal Rites*, W.J.T. Mitchell writes that "acknowledging the claim that animals might have or deserve rights entails a revolution in thinking and behaviour

² That is, as in Adorno's negative dialectics, to work against what is settled on as reality, to work against preservation to open the possibilities inherent in non-identity.

so profound that it would shake the foundations of human society” (ix). It is not simply a matter, however, for Mitchell or for Wolfe, of human beings asserting “natural” or historically produced rights and granting some of these rights or protections to animals. Indeed, the animal rights arguments of analytic philosophers, such as Peter Singer and Tom Regan, fall short of problematising the very structures which define the human over and against the animal, of the human as first and independent actor who might logically defend the position of the animal as other³. What is at stake in the question of the animal, as articulated by Wolfe, Jacques Derrida and others, is the supposed stability of a divide between generalized concepts of the human and the animal, the exposure of ways in which the human has been defined over and against the excluded animal, and the continuing articulation of ways in which this question registers in and re-entangles problems of discourse as well as of subjectivity, authority and knowledge.

Derrida’s articulation of the question of the animal follows his reading of Heidegger: for Heidegger, the animal is without world or poor in world. Derrida suggests, however, that this relationship to the world is *other* than human: the problem, then, is how to articulate this otherness. As Wolfe suggests, it is a question of how and indeed whether it is possible, not to understand the animal (within an anthro- and carnophallogocentric framework), but to “stand under” the animal, to be “vulnerable to other knowledges” (*Rites* 5). And as Lippit argues,

The idea of an ‘other relationship’ provides a crucial glimpse into the possibility of an animal world. Positing another way of relating the human and animal worlds, Derrida

³ More pointedly, Wolfe argues that “one of the central ironies of animal rights philosophy...is that its philosophical frame remains an essentially humanist one in its most important philosophers (utilitarianism in Peter Singer, neo-Kantianism in Tom Regan), thus effacing the very difference of the animal other that animal rights sought to respect in the first place” (Introduction, *Zoontologies*, xii). Leonard Lawler, in his *This is Not Sufficient*, and Matthew Calarco, in *Zoographies*, echo this position. On the other hand, it should be noted that Peter Singer in his introduction to *Animal Philosophy*, suggests that poststructuralist philosophy’s displacement of the subject and skepticism about the discourse of rights has done very little good for real animals.

moves the question of the animal from one of its existence (does the animal have world?) to that of the relationship by which humanity might discover the animal world (can one speak of or comprehend an animal world?) (Electric 59-60)

Indeed, in his “The Animal that Therefore I Am (More to Follow),” Derrida imagines what it means to be vulnerable to his own small white cat’s gaze. Derrida’s cat looks at him, but this does not lead him to project a fantasy of mutuality, of sameness and recognition. Instead, Derrida is left vulnerable, unhinged, asking what it means to be seen by this cat? This interaction is not an already-conceptualised relation; there is no fixed structure that dictates a reaction to his vulnerability. Thus, the interaction becomes a question which calls for an undetermined response. And so Derrida suggests: “The said question of the said animal in its entirety comes down to knowing not whether the animal speaks but whether one can know what *respond* means. And how to distinguish a response from a reaction” (377). That is, if Derrida’s encounter with this cat is not one which simply effaces difference, and if he faces his own vulnerability, the question is no longer—as it has been for so many thinkers who have posited language or the ability to speak, as the divide between the human and the animal—whether the animal speaks. Instead of seeing a lack in the cat (as the inability to speak), and quickly re-asserting one’s mastery, being vulnerable to the cat’s gaze, to “other knowledges” means questioning one’s own standing, and specifically, asking of oneself whether “one can know what *respond* means.”

Derrida further explores a supposed division between the human and the animal, and between response and reaction, in his reading of Jacques Lacan⁴ in “And Say the Animal

⁴ Derrida focuses on Lacan’s essay, ‘The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire in the Freudian Unconscious,’ but also brings in other writings from Lacan’s *Écrits: A Selection*.

Responded?” For Lacan, “the function of language is not to inform to invoke” (qtd. in “And Say” 126). Animals, for Lacan, do not have language, but a code which informs; Lacan’s example of this is the dance that a honeybee performs to let its fellow hive-dwellers know where to find nectar. Its dance is, for Lacan, a direct mapping, and thus a code to which the bee’s companions might react. In other words, Lacan draws a distinction between information, which animals might exchange, and human language, signs that “take on their value in relation to one another” (qtd. 126). Derrida interrogates this sharp division between response and reaction. For, if “reaction” is what animals do, according to their very nature, if it is programmed, this seems to indicate that what humans perform is, likewise automatically, response. This sharp division, in other words, places reacting animals on one side, and responsible humans on the other. One of the problems with this, for Derrida, is that “the purity, rigor, and indivisibility of the concept of responsibility that ensues” makes responsibility no more than a programmed reaction (127). But “casting doubt on responsibility,” is, for Derrida, “the unrescindable essence of ethics” (128). Furthermore, Derrida suggests, this does not mean that he does not see a difference between response and reaction, but that this difference cannot be divided along the lines of “the human” and “the general”; this division rigidifies animal and human as concepts and makes “the animal” always the non-subject—without response, without language—which is subjected to the human subject.

That is, the human subject is considered by Lacan to be [the] subject to language, to the signifier. Yet Derrida indicates that to be subject to language, for Lacan, is also to presume some kind of mastery over language. Derrida further elucidates this in his reading of another of Lacan’s divisions between the human and the animal: Derrida argues that Lacan dogmatically states that the animal is capable of *dansity*, of pretense—by means of lure, seduction or parade,

but is not capable of pretending a pretense—of the possibility of telling the truth in order to lead the other astray. Derrida writes:

According to Lacan, the animal would be incapable of this type of lie, of this deceit, of this pretense in the second degree, whereas “the subject of the signifier,” within the human order, would possess such a power and, better still, would emerge as subject, instituting itself and coming to itself as subject *by virtue of this power*, a second-degree-reflexive power, a power that is *conscious* of being able to deceive by pretending to pretend. (130)

For Lacan, the human is subject to but also master of language in having this conscious power to deceive. And while Lacan insists that the signifier is always dominant over the subject, this second-degree reflexive power suggests that the subject is also a kind of conscious master, as Derrida writes, “having in any case sufficient mastery to be able to be capable of pretending to pretend and hence of being able to put into effect one’s power to destroy one’s trace” (132).

Indeed, alongside his reading of Lacan’s discussion of pretense, Derrida critiques Lacan’s sharp division between the animal who might leave tracks, but who is not able to erase them, and the human, who is capable both of inscribing tracks or traces, and of erasing them. Here, Derrida argues that there can be no indivisible line between leaving a trace and erasure of that trace; Derrida is particularly wary of a distinction that supposes that the human might consciously erase his trace, as he might consciously pretend a pretense. This supposed mastery of the trace, for Derrida, overlooks “that every erased trace, in consciousness, can leave a trace of its erasure whose symptom (individual, or social, historical political, and so on) will always be capable of ensuring its return” (138). Derrida suggests that this is not to say that the trace is not erasable;

instead: “Traces erase (themselves), like everything else, but the structure of the trace is such that it cannot be in anyone’s *power* to erase it, and especially not to ‘judge’ its erasure, even less by means of a constitutive power assured of being able to erase, performatively, what erases itself” (138).

For Derrida, the idea of finding a clear dividing line between human and animal is ridiculous. Derrida suggests that he does not contest that there is a “rupture or abyss between this “I-we” and what we *call* animals” (his emphasis); to ignore this abyss, for Derrida would mean “forgetting all the signs that I have sought to give, tirelessly, of my attention to difference, to differences, to heterogeneities and abyssal ruptures as against the homogeneous and the continuous” (“Therefore” 398). This abyss, for Derrida, is not “a single indivisible line” so that “it can no longer be traced, objectified or counted” as such (“Therefore” 399). Derrida suggests, then, there is no line, with, on either side, Man and Animal in general, that this abyssal rupture has a history, and that “beyond the line of the so-called human,” there is “already a heterogeneous multiplicity of the living”:

a multiplicity of organizations of relations between living and dead, relations of organization or lack of organization among realms that are more and more difficult to dissociate by means of the figures of the organic and inorganic, of life and/or death. These relations are at once close and abyssal, and they can never be totally objectified. (“Therefore” 399)

Thus, in his articulations of the question of the animal, Derrida brings into focus the fact that an indivisible line between the human and the animal is always troubled; indeed it is a fantasy. This “abyssal rupture”—between, humans and what humans call animals—is always multiple, and

might be, I think, only followed in its particularities. Derrida problematises the human subject⁵, as the subject of language, insofar as this subject becomes subject by in fact displaying a power, a mastery over the signifier or the trace. Furthermore, the question of the animal is, for Derrida, a question of—or opening for ethics, or response, of whether one can know what response means.

Matthew Calarco, in his *Zoographies*, likewise follows the question of the animal, asking in particular, what is or can be meant by “animal” and how a radical political transformation in an understanding of animals (and humans) might take place. He suggests that it is philosophy that “is able to hold open the possibility that thought might proceed otherwise in regard to animals, without the assurances of traditional conceptions of animality and the human-animal distinction” (4). Calarco speaks of the “event” of animals, as that which is un-anticipatable and un-represented in advance, as one of the primary problems, for him, is a limited discourse—indeed, a failure of discourse—of or surrounding the animal. While philosophical and scientific discourses are necessary and taken up by Calarco for a discussion of human-animal relations, for him, the question of the animal must point towards a revolution in language: “[t]here is no doubt that we need to think unheard-of thoughts about animals, that we need new languages, new artworks, new histories, even new sciences and philosophies” (6). As well, Calarco extends the question of the animal to interrogate humanism and anthropocentrism, and suggests that to radicalise left-wing politics, the universal—which Calarco argues is never empty, but always, in fact exclusive and human—must be truly emptied and dehumanised. Alongside this, radical critiques of subjectivity, which he feels have been prematurely foreclosed, must be pursued to new political ends.

⁵ Derrida further problematises the self-present and self-identical subject in “Eating Well.”

Indeed, Deleuze and Guattari, in their articulations of “becoming animal” offer a radical critique of subjectivity and of any presumed man/ nature distinction. Becoming animal is, as they stress, affective and not representative...it does not refer back to an “animalistic’ biological drive or foundation; it is “affect in itself, the drive in person, and represents nothing” (*Thousand* 259). Becoming-animal likewise affirms a non-anthropocentric nature, as it is not a projected image, but another productive machine, alive and desiring and endlessly productive of new multiplicities. That is, as Derrida critiques the self-identity of the subject, so the self-identity of something called nature is critiqued and opened to new becomings. Instead of set relations between things, becoming-animal and becoming-other is a part of what Deleuze and Guattari call the rhizome; in these rhizomatic assemblages, nature(s) become part of a production among what is usually considered radically dissimilar.

Whose Nature?

Guattari further pursues the possibilities of rhizomatic assemblages in his *Three Ecologies*. He argues that a transversality among what he calls social, mental, and environmental ecologies is possible that will allow for new assemblages, life forms, narratives, and subjectivities. This transversality—like the rhizome—welcomes productions between dissimilar and unlikely things, things which do not stand in a set relation to one another⁶. In this way, “nature,” or “the environment” does not stand apart as something against which—or even within

⁶ In his opening chapter to *Deleuze/ Guattari & Ecology*, Bernd Herzogenrath follows ways in which Deleuze and Guattari’s thought produces nature, and a geophilosophy, anew. For Deleuze and Guattari, nature is a machine, neither subject nor object but one of the many “self-organising, ordered and static, dynamic, biological machines, and discursive and cultural machines of representation” that are endlessly forming new productions, new becomings and multiplicities (8). Herzogenrath argues that “[w]hile deep ecology subjectifies and shallow ecologies objectify nature, Deleuze’s flat ecologies intensify it, by opening up the philosophical subject to the realm of nonhuman machines, affects, haecceities”(11).

which—subjects define themselves. Ecology, then, is not conceived of as a protection of nature; it is instead produced and productive of a radical restructuring of life, systems, and histories⁷.

While traditional ecological thinking might take the form of “nature writing,” an aesthetic appreciation of or protective feeling towards the environment, it might also take the shape of an eco-centric thinking. Eco-centric deep ecologists assert the value of human and non-human life apart from any (anthropocentric) utility⁸. Although nature writing has been criticized as anthropocentric and “shallow” environmentalism, deep ecology, as well, is sometimes judged misanthropic or even dangerously fascistic⁹. And yet, both of these positions take for granted that some unproblematic “nature” exists. It is this “nature” that both Kate Soper and Timothy Morton interrogate in their analyses, and which, I think, must be problematised in order to re-imagine possible productions or relations between humans and animals.

As Timothy Morton suggests: “[p]utting something called Nature on a pedestal and admiring it from afar does for the environment what patriarchy does for the figure of Woman” (*Ecology* 5). Indeed, as for Jacques Lacan, Woman does not exist, so Nature does not exist; that is, Nature, as a singular essence is but a fantasy. Morton argues that there is no “thing” called Nature that is “single, independent, and lasting”; there are always multiple ideas of nature and

⁷ Guattari’s social ecology should be distinguished from that of, for example Murray Bookchin, who in *Remaking Society* criticizes the ecological effort as it is conceived either as a piecemeal effort made by popular groups or as state reform. Murray wants to—through re-conceiving a common social interest and movement—redefine human relations to one another and to nature; this includes, for Bookchin, a focus on the importance of the city for a new politics (as a space for assembly and face-to-face gatherings). While Bookchin’s social ecology is a re-making of human, social, natural relations, it does not go as far as Guattari’s transversality, in dissolving oppositions and in its range of possible productions.

⁸ In his *Ecocriticism*, Greg Garrard briefly outlines various ecological positions, ranging from “shallow” environmentalists, to deep ecologists, ecofeminists, social ecologists and ecosophists (16-32)

⁹ See Luc Ferry’s *The New Ecological Order*, in which deep ecology (and a reductive understanding of eco-feminism) is deemed childish and—in its unified vision of a whole earth—fascistic. He suggests that arguing for the rights of trees is ridiculous, comparing this to early European animal trials in which animals were tried (and a leech, hanged) for criminal deeds. Ferry maintains a human-animal, human-nature distinction and argues for a moderate, Kantian respect for the diversity of the orders of nature and for the duty humans have to protect.

various things which might be subsumed under the heading (20). Indeed, Morton suggests, so many material things are thought of as a part of nature that this list of part becomes transcendent: “a metonymic series becomes a metaphor”(14). Nature becomes either an empty placeholder, or a fantasy which encapsulates various fantasy objects, or a “force of law,” against which deviations are measured (14). Morton’s concern is to shift from nature as background—whether as a transcendent order or physical backdrop—and to make it matter. This is not, however, to settle on the materiality of nature, as merely “stuff out there,” but to insist both on this materiality and on theorizations of nature as important to further critiques of this concept and to think a way into as Morton writes, “an ecology to come” (6).

Kate Soper, too, in *What is Nature?*, is concerned with Nature as both material and in its many cultural constructions. Soper positions herself between a “postmodernist” position of nature as only constructed and discursive and a “realist” position that attributes to nature an independent reality. She is interested in the politics of the idea of nature, and the ways that this idea is and has been defined and contested and defended. She traces a history of human/ nature divisions—from Descartes to Kant and Hegel to Heidegger—and broadly distinguishes a split between monist and dualist positions. Broadly, a dualist position always maintains the difference of human from nature or animal in kind, and not just degree, and, on the other hand, a monist or naturalist position holds that humans are only different, if at all, in degree. Soper reads Freud, for example, as a monist: humans, as biological beings, are driven by instinct: everything that comes later—repression, sublimation, culture—is human, but this is a difference in degree, not kind, as human are still driven, fundamentally, by biological needs (37-60).

It is this relationship between humans and nature that eco-phenomenology wants to redefine. As an intersection of ecological and phenomenological concerns, eco-phenomenology

proposes a way to revitalize and re-conceive “nature” itself by re-figuring humans’ relationship to nature. Eco-phenomenology is critical of habituated—and stultifying—methods of experiencing—and likewise of petrified concepts of—nature, and of the subject as defined in opposition to nature. Charles S. Brown and Ted Toadvine suggest that eco-phenomenology affords a way to critique this understanding of humanity, subjectivity, and nature; it offers a way of remembering and rebuilding a bridge between “the natural world and our own that is “potentially revolutionary” (*Back xx*).

David Wood likewise suggests that eco-phenomenology is “the pursuit of the relationalities of worldly engagement, both human and those of other creatures” (*Back 213*), and is a way of contributing to “an enhanced attentiveness to the complexity of natural phenomena and the ease with which that is hidden from view by our ordinary experience” (*Back 217*). Wood suggests phenomenology’s grounding is, traditionally, in the experience of the subject. This furthers a divide between, on one hand, intentionality (of the subject), and on the other, naturalism or causality: the human will defines in opposition to (a passive order of) nature. By expanding the idea of intentionality or consciousness, as always grounded in one’s body and environment (following Merleau-Ponty), Wood argues that eco-phenomenology allows for thinking an overlap between naturalism and intentionality. That is, he argues for a consciousness-with, as an always interrelated activity, in place of a clearly-delimited consciousness of; “natural phenomena...spill over into what we normally think of as distinct questions of meaning, identity and value,” into intentionality (*Back 224*). Eco-phenomenology, then, emphasizes embodied experience, and it seeks “not to explain the world as if from outside, but to give voice to the world from our experienced situation *within* it” (David Abram, *Spell 47*).

In this way, the boundaries between subject and object, and between human as determining and nature (and animals) as determined are refined as a porous exchange.¹⁰

The question of nature—as I will call it for now—involves, as does the question of the animal, an interrogation of the figure of the human, in this case as defined in opposition to nature.¹¹ If nature is to be opened to rhizomatic productions or networked assemblages, the concept itself must be rigorously reworked, emptied, or unhinged. Both Guattari's transversality and eco-phenomenology offer ways in, ways of allowing what might be called the non-identity of nature to emerge in various ways and open to other possibilities. Animals, conceived within a binary framework as merely a part of determined nature, might in his unhinging, allow their difference to speak. Human/animal/nature might be defined not in opposition (nor as part of a Natural order), but might be emptied, pulled up at the roots, and reassembled. These new associations, and an ethics of how to respond to such intertwinings, help to form what I call an

¹⁰ Subject/ object, nature/culture, human/nature binaries are further criticized by Val Plumwood, in her *Environmental Culture*, as part of a "monological" rationalistic approach that denies human dependence on the other. Plumwood critiques humans "illusory sense of autonomy" and reduction of human reason(s) to a unitary and divisive rationalism (9). Plumwood's approach is feminist: she seeks to articulate "othered" perspectives to critique dominant forms of reason which determine human/non human relations. Her argument can hardly be suggested to be a form of the Earth-goddess, woodland sprite cult that Bookchin claims eco-feminism is, or the hodge-podge of approaches and conclusions that Ferry dismisses as eco-feminism.

¹¹The critique of subject/object binaries and of "man" and nature as opposing forces figures centrally in Adorno's work. Horkheimer and Adorno are concerned with the ways in which enlightenment reason reduces natural phenomena to inanimate and exploitable matter and "mere objectivity" (*Dialectic* 6). Indeed, in his re-conception of a "natural history," Adorno rejects an idea of nature as "that which has always been there, that which appears as a fatefully organized, pre-given being bears human history, indeed appears in human history, and constitutes that which is substantial in human history" (qtd in Hanssen 14). Beatrice Hanssen suggests that Adorno's natural history is always already a "mutual imbrication" of nature and history; there is no nature against man, or man against history (16).

animal city, an animalecopolis, a way of allowing for encounters with “other” animals, for the “animal” and “nature” to rupture the human and run loose in the very human space of the polis.

Who Let the Dogs In? From Modern to Post-Human Cities

If the city has often been defined as quintessentially human—indeed, as humanity’s apotheosis—it has likewise been imagined as inhuman: the end of authentic experience, of traditional knowledge, an abrupt break with nature and history. To think an animal city is to trouble traditional foundations and discourses of the city. Humanism, subjectivity, experiences of the city, and the city’s borders and flows: each of these asks to be further examined or opened to a broader range of possibilities. To think about ways in which animals might matter in the city, I shall sketch out some traditional definitions and ways of thinking the city, and then follow the animal into this space to articulate some of the problems and potentialities she brings.

Traditional Groundings

The urban sociologist Louis Wirth defines a city as a particular kind of “human association” (“Urbanism” 98). For Wirth, the city is a new kind of organization in which individuals are increasingly separated from nature and from a traditional heritage. Yet, Wirth suggests that even as folk traditions decline and kinship bonds weaken, city dwellers develop new webs of relations: “While on the one hand the traditional ties of human association are weakened, urban existence involves a much greater degree of interdependence between man and man and a more complicated, fragile, and volatile form of mutual interrelations over many phases of which the individual as such can exert scarcely any control” (“Urbanism” 104). Although Wirth is writing in the first half of the 20th century, and is critical of the changes urbanization brings, it is interesting that he notes both increased interdependency and decreased

agency (in the sense of acting alone and unhindered) as central changes that the city brings. Both Latour and Haraway will take up and indeed celebrate these conditions: the decreased power of the individual makes way for the multi-faceted power of a network of agents, and interdependency demands new kinds of responses.

Furthermore, for Wirth, the city “puts a premium on visual recognition. We tend to acquire and develop a sensitivity to a world of artifacts and become progressively farther removed from the world of nature” (“Urbanism” 100). Interestingly, primacy of vision has been noted by Freud as being one of the “organic” factors of repression, as smell was replaced “by sight as the dominant sense” (Peter Gay, “Intro,” *Civilization* 5)¹². And certainly, the importance of vision, as well as an upright carriage, is an often-articulated difference between the man, who (although repressed!) surveils all he sees, and the animal, whose dependence on the less dignified sense of smell, keeps him closer to the earth and limits his power. Walter Benjamin, too, in his “On Some Motifs in Baudelaire,” examines the eye of the city dweller, which he argues, becomes “overburdened” with a protective function. Benjamin quotes Georg Simmel, who argues that, “[t]he interpersonal relationships of people in big cities are characterized by a markedly greater emphasis on the use of the eyes than that of the ears” because of the necessity of “having to stare at one another for minutes or even hours on end without saying a word” (191). This protective eye is certainly a part of the Freudian “protective coating,” which, for Benjamin, is the consciousness which protects the human sensorium against the shocking

¹² Indeed, Freud asks “why do our relatives, the animals, not exhibit” the cultural struggle that human beings face, between life and death drives, and between destructive and civilizing forces and the resultant low-grade aggression and discontent? The lack of this conflict, however, Freud suggests, leaves animals in a state of arrested development: “it may be that a temporary balance has been reached between the influences of their environment and the mutually contending instincts within them, and that thus a cessation of development has come about” (*Civilization* 83).

number of stimuli in the city. And whilst this eye protects, it also limits experience: the city dweller remains, in this vigilant mode, in the sphere of *Erlebnis*. Experience does not register deeply, as in *Erfahrung*, but remains momentary and guarded.

As Wirth focuses on the city as a new form of human association, Lewis Mumford too focuses on social aspects of the city. Indeed, for Mumford, the city's most important function is social: its economic and political functions are secondary to the ways in which it is able to promote social intercourse. For Mumford, "The city fosters art and is art; the city creates the theater and is the theater. It is in the city, the city as theater, that man's more purposive activities are focused, and work out, through conflicting and cooperating personalities, events, groups, into more significant culminations [...] The city must be "as a stage-set, well-designed," so that it "intensifies and underlines the gestures of the actors and the action of the play" (*What is a City*" 94). This idea of the city as theatre is echoed by Hannah Arendt, whose description of classical city-states provides the foundation for her understanding of the city as a political—and most human—"space of appearance."

For Hannah Arendt, the public sphere, or the polis, is the space in which human potentiality and power might appear. Indeed, it is the space necessary for humanity to appear as such. For Arendt, the needs of the "biological animal" must be met so that participation in the public sphere is possible and one might live a political and properly human life¹³. Arendt argues that "[t]he *polis*, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies

¹³ Derrida suggests that this division between *zoë*, and *bios*, was not secure or definite even for Aristotle, and that both what Agamben calls "bare life" (*zoë*,) and political or individual life (*bios*) have always coincided with the political realm (*The Beast and the Sovereign* 329)

between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be” (198). As such, the polis is a space of appearance: “Its peculiarity is that, unlike the spaces which are the work of our hands, it does not survive the actuality of the moment which brought it into being, but disappears not only with the dispersal of men—as in the case of great catastrophes when the body politic of a people is destroyed—but with the disappearance or arrest of activities themselves” (199). The activity, for Arendt, which brings these spaces into being and is possible only within these spaces—and which defines man as man—is speech¹⁴.

Not surprisingly, Arendt defines speech “as the decisive distinction between human and animal life” (205). It is speech and action, and finally, one’s life story that defines one as uniquely human. Interestingly, and I think significantly, this story cannot be told or read oneself: in Arendt’s polis one is not the modern, self-mastering subject. Instead, one’s story can only be told in hindsight, by the storyteller-historian. Arendt writes that “nobody is the author or producer of his own life story. In other words, the stories, the results of actions and speech reveal an agent, but this agent is not an author or producer. Somebody began it and is its subject in the twofold sense of the word, namely, its actor and sufferer, but nobody is its author” (184). Thus, as Derrida shows ways in which the idea of a self-present individual or auto-biography is always troubled—and cannot on this ground, stand over and against the animal—so too, Arendt’s subject is more complex than self-transparent. For Arendt, the actor is not merely a doer, but a sufferer.

Likewise, for Arendt, action, the quintessential human activity of the polis, is “never possible in isolation; to be isolated is to be deprived of the capacity to act” (188). Further, action

¹⁴ Speech, for Arendt, is not about things; what is essential to it is its revelatory character.

never involves merely two people: it is boundless and affects countless others as each action is a reaction and calls out for further responses (190). Indeed, essential to Arendt's polis is the potential boundless power that is possible when human beings are gathered together in this way. When a polis is no longer this assembly, but a collection of isolated wills, this power warps to the force of violence and tyranny. Thus, although Arendt's polis is, on one hand, a traditional humanist association, on the other hand, her understanding of speech and action, as well as her "suffering" actor underscores the importance of interdependence, not the individual. This sense of interdependence defines Arendt's conception of the city, and, indeed, of what it is to be a human being. In this way, her polis reaches out of modernist conceptions of the individual and points the way to more intertwined ways of understanding the city and being. And yet, for Arendt, the animal remains at the gates of the polis.¹⁵

Inhuman Networks and Cosmopolitical Animals

As well as essentially human, the traditional modern city might be thought of as the modernist Western utopia, the planned and divided city of Le Corbusier, for example, whose ideal projections exorcised nature and history, and thus, ultimately, forsook the human in whose image and for whom they were devised. And a postmodern city might restore the very ambiguities—the layers, heterogeneous spaces, histories and voices—which a modernist city erased or marginalized. Further, (in what I realise are very broad strokes) the modernist city might be idealized as a city of individuals, who must find their spaces—a certain range of movement—within the place of the city, while the postmodern city begins with a fixed place but then opens to a proliferation of spaces, histories, and voices through which a subject is

¹⁵ The animal remains incapable of the revelation of speech; this is not unlike the "poverty" of Heidegger's animal, who remains unable to enter the Open because she is a part of it.

(temporarily) constituted. Again, while this offers a much too generalized definition of these cities, it offers some comparison for articulating a post- or in-human, or, more precisely, for me, the difference of an animal city.

Bruno Latour, in his *We Have Never Been Modern* complicates the division between the modern and postmodern, and articulates a kind of posthuman mediation. Latour suggests that what it means to be modern is to separate two practices, those of translation and purification. Latour writes that translation

creates mixtures between entirely new types of beings, hybrids of nature and culture. The second [practice]... ‘purification’ creates two entirely distinct ontological zones: that of human beings, on the one hand; that of nonhumans on the other. Without the second, the work of translation would be slowed down, limited or even ruled out. The first corresponds to what I have called networks; the second to what I call the modern critical stance. (10-11)

This modern position creates a “Great Divide” between the human and the nonhuman. Insofar as the modern city is predicated on this divide between nature and culture, it is based on “purified” human being, being cleansed of all nature and animal, and thus, essentially of all flesh: a skeleton.

Yet, as Latour suggests, practices of translation and purification are always interconnected, and it is the modern focus on purification that allows for hybrids to proliferate under the radar. Thus, even moderns—and the modern city—are not truly modern, as the very refusal to acknowledge hybrids allows these forms to thrive. As well, a postmodern position which is an attempt to “free” the rigidity of the modernist position, and which takes the “Great

Divide” –between human and non-human—at face value (as if this were ever truly the case), is, for Latour, merely an “antimodernist” position. Latour does recognize value, however, in a postmodern positioning that interrogates boundaries between the natural and the artificial, inside and outside and that questions how subjects are constituted within and through webs of discourse.

More than asking how human subjects are constituted, Latour wants to extend both the range and the concept of subjectivity (or actor) to include nonhumans, things, technologies and sciences. Latour thinks simultaneously about practices of purification, which separate, and of translation, which produce entirely new assemblages. This leads him away from thinking of the human as either an entirely stable being or as formless: instead, the human and human history should be seen as always intertwined with other actors. Among these actors is what is traditionally excluded as non or inhuman. For Latour, humans are intermediaries of a porous exchange: they might be separated as individual actors, but they are also always hybrids, part of ongoing, re-shaping assemblages that create other beings who are likewise actors. Thinking about the post-human, for Latour, is not an emptying of nor a celebration of the death of the human, but offers a more complex and enriched way of thinking of human being; being is “irreducible,” to a single definition, as it always registers (and reforms) within a network of nonhuman actors (138).

Latour not only expands on Arendt’s traditional actor but also reconsiders the role of speech to define man as a political animal. While he agrees that humans have human speech, Latour reconsiders what a more inclusive discussion in a new “politics of nature” might mean: he suggests that both humans and nonhumans often have political spokespersons. And while this representative voice is not without its problems, the spokesperson, for Latour, registers as a

more general “speech impedimenta,” or as the difficulties that both nonhuman and human beings have in speaking (as there is no transparent or manifest meaning), so that articulation is always mediated by various prostheses (*Politics* 62-4). In this way, speech, or more properly, discussion, becomes possible among various actors in Latour’s re-imagined networks, which in their multiple associations form collectives and a new cosmopolitics.

Donna Haraway, too, following Isabelle Stengers, writes of a cosmopolitics in her *When Species Meet*. This is always a cosmopolitics to come. Haraway quotes Stengers: “the cosmos refers to the unknown constituted by...multiple divergent worlds, and to the articulations of which they could eventually be capable, as opposed to the temptation of a peace intended to be final” (35). Thus, the Latourian “discussions” involving multiple and ever-new (rhizomatic, in Deleuzian terms) assemblages are not teleologically directed, but ongoing. For Haraway, to be cosmo-political is to be responsive and caring towards the worldly entanglements in which one finds oneself. For Haraway, human being is always a “becoming with” others: the human body is made up of ninety percent nonhuman cells (3), Haraway herself is a “companion species” alongside her dog as they “become other” together in playful “contact zones” (208), and humans are always cyborgs, dependent on prosthetic technologies.

For Haraway, responding within and to one’s everyday entanglements—to the material and discursive networks of which one is always a part—cannot be a conditioned response. Following Derrida, Haraway argues that when puzzlements about how to look back at, how to face these entanglements are hardened into a conditioned response, then an ethics—which is opened only because of uncertainty—is no longer possible. Being openly responsive towards these entanglements, assemblages, and the unexpected shapes that “becomings with” might take

is a kind of cosmopolitical engagement, for Haraway. It is a way of becoming other-worldly, not just becoming other.

Both Latour and Haraway offer ways of rethinking human being as well as of imagining inhuman—in the Lyotardian sense of being transformative, unpredictable, and unmasterable—associations¹⁶. It is in this way that the animal might at least find her way into a politics, as a kind of cosmo-political animal. As well, this re-figuring of the human allows an important way to initiate further questioning of the city: if the city is a built environment, how should animals and nature be taken into account?¹⁷ If the city is a “space of appearance,” how do the voices of animals and natural things register and how must and can they be responded to?

Derrida, in “On Cosmopolitanism,” imagines a new kind of “city of refuge” for those without papers, those unprotected by the nation-state. He writes of this city that “we ought [not] to restore an essentially classical concept of the city by giving it new attributes and powers; neither would it be simply a matter of endowing the old subject we call ‘the city’ with new predicates. No, we are dreaming of another concept, of another set of rights for the city, of another politics of the city”(8). Derrida suggests that thinking about what kind of city might offer refuge relates to questions of residency and hospitality, and hospitality, for Derrida *is* ethics:

Hospitality is culture itself and not simply one ethic amongst others. Insofar as it has to do with the ethos, that is, the residence, one’s home, the familiar place of dwelling,

¹⁶ As Lyotard argues in *The Inhuman*, there are two senses of the inhuman: the first, negative, sense of this term names the way in which humans have become inhuman under the codifications and explanations of capitalism—the pre-scripted human. On the other hand, the surprising and strange possibilities—left open from childhood—that the second inhuman opens offer transformative (inhuman) possibilities.

¹⁷ While my interests are, and my project is, concerned more with theorizing a cosmopolitics, I find important as well the question of how animals might or should effect city policy or the city as built environment. Jennifer Wolch, in her “Zoöpolis” articulates an urban theory in which nonhuman life matters (*Animal Geographies*).

inasmuch as it is a manner of being there, the manner in which we relate to ourselves and to others, to others as our own or as foreigners, *ethics is hospitality*. (17)

Hospitality, as Derrida suggests, has to do with the *οἶκος*, with the home and space of dwelling, and thus with eco-logy. I would like to further pursue a connection between Derrida's hospitality, ethos, and ecology, and his "city of refuge," as it offers, I think, another way to reconfigure and re-puzzle the animal, nature and city and to reframe an ethics and questions of residency and citizenship.

Everyday Life in the City

Cosmopolitanism, as outlined here, is concerned with extended, expanding and ever-shifting networks, as well as to everyday entanglements and relations. To both extend and define my field of interest, I would like, finally, to pay attention to the experience of everyday life in the city. That is in order to open additional questions of the city: Whose experience matters? If this range of experience is broadened and shifts to include others—animal, nature and various assemblages—then how does, or might, this register? What is a human-animal-nature city experience?

Benjamin writes of the (human) experience of the modern city as inhuman: the guarded experience of the city-dweller, the loss of aura and the interesting (and necessary for the flâneur) but vaguely frightening and alienating crowds add to the inhuman character of the city. Benjamin, moreover, quotes Valery, who suggests that "[t]he inhabitant of the great urban centers...reverts to a state of savagery--that is, of isolation" a most inhuman condition ("Motifs" 174). Of course this "inhuman" is quite removed from Latour or Haraway's inhuman: indeed, Haraway's understanding of the everyday entanglements of "companion species" offers a way of

thinking through ways in which everyday practices bear (inhuman) becomings and one's responsibility towards these.¹⁸

It is through everyday activities, for Henri Lefebvre, that humans might overcome alienation and (re)engage in embodied lived experience and become "total" beings. As Michael Gardiner writes in his *Critiques of Everyday Life*,

the everyday represents the site where we enter into a dialectical relationship with the external natural and social worlds in the most immediate and profound sense, and it is here where essential human desires, powers and potentialities are initially formulated, developed and realized concretely. It is through our mundane interactions with the material world that both subject and object are fully constituted and humanized through the medium of conscious human praxis. (75-6)

For both Lefebvre and Michael de Certeau, it is the activity of everyday life that constitutes subjects and objects in an "endless production," as "[b]eing is measured by doing" (*Practice* 137). Likewise, for both of these thinkers, the use and practice of a city open the place of the city from the determined grid of city planners and the fixed relations of exchange under capitalism, to a proliferation of spaces and possible relations.

¹⁸ Nigel Thrift, in his "Electric Animal," suggests that the human/ technology relationship is akin to a human/ companion animal one. Thrift argues that the relationship between humans and pets is variously rendered; it might be one of dominance/ submission, cruelty, joy, etc., but it is a relationship, for Thrift, defined by the needs and affects of the human. At the same time, it is a relationship that reads the companion animal as something more than simply "other," and it is this complexity which might be useful for thinking about the hybridity which is the techno-human in everyday life. Haraway's "companion species", on the other hand, suggests that these becomings are always mutual imbrications, not directed by human desires. (This is not to suggest that Haraway thinks that human beings and their pets share equal power, although she does suggest that through play and in "contact zones" humans and animals open to the joy of "becomings together" anew).

But what does this mean for animals? In one way, and to echo Haraway, if we critique this subject/divide and see animals and humans in a kind of endless production, both of—if I use the terms just as a temporary holding spaces—subjectivities and cities, then this focus on the practices of everyday life again draws attention, again, to this mutual imbrication and responsibility towards “the other.” And while companion animals, “sentimental Oedipal animals,” as they are dismissed by Guattari and Deleuze, might be the only visible animals in the city, a focus on everyday practices inevitably must concern itself with and draw attention to invisible animals, animals cast out of the city. Thus, for example, the many animals, who are bred, suffer, and then killed and sold as factory-farmed “products,” and by-products might at the very least be recognised, made visible. And even, perhaps, as Latour imagines in a new “collective,” animals might be given voice). Thus, the body and the voice of animals might come into the city as questions of social justice.¹⁹

And finally, a focus on everyday life and experience might allow for an imaginative turn to animal experience. As Brett Buchanan suggests, for example, Uexküll’s animal environments point to the many worlds and systems of animal and offer a new way of thinking about (other) realities by taking in account a “subjective experience of the animal” (2). While imagining this experience is, of course, problematic, burdened by anthropocentrism and anthropomorphism, it still seems a worthwhile project. I do not imagine this as an attempt to think like a (Nagel’s) bat,

¹⁹ For David Harvey, to theorise the city is to theorise social justice. Harvey explores justice as a historical, place-based concept, and argues that although this term is relative and must be interrogated, it still hold currency and are capable of stirring up revolutionary thoughts (even if imprecisely defined, limited). Harvey looks at diverse elements of social justice to come up with a multi-part definition. One part of Harvey’s definition considers the ecological consequences of city development and planning, and the impact on the environment and future generations (While Harvey, like Ferry, denies that nature has ‘rights’ or can be ‘oppressed’). (“Social Justice, Postmodernism, and the City”). If animals were to have voice and matter in the city, More than a part of an order of “nature”, if animals were to matter in the city, they would not be merely “protected” but their voices, I think, would help form the very definition of social justice.

or to understand the (Wittgenstein's) lion but to explore diverse ways into animal experience as new productions²⁰.

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²⁰ That is, I want to further explore the affective, non-representative productions of Deleuze and Guattari's becoming-animal as well as other productions, for example, Temple Grandin's thinking like a cow, the dog narrator in John Berger's *King*, and the roving, urban dog packs and experimental verse of Toby Barlow's *Sharp Teeth*.

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